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Private companies typically have only a limited number of owners, each with a large own-
ership share. This concentrated ownership helps to overcome control problems caused by
the opaqueness of business operations. However, it also exposes owners to idiosyncratic risk,
since they often invest a high share of their personal net worth in a single company. Their
personal portfolios are therefore not well diversiﬁed. If owners require a compensation for
their risk exposure, they have to demand higher returns on their equity investment, which
is equivalent to higher costs of equity capital.
We test two hypotheses about the consequences of owners’ lack of diversiﬁcation. First,
since poor diversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital, we expect a higher demand
for bank ﬁnancing from owners who have invested a higher share of their personal wealth in
the company. This would be the consequence if owners tried to equalize the marginal cost
of equity and debt capital. Second, we hypothesize that a higher exposure to idiosyncratic
risk leads to higher leverage. This is the central point of interest of this paper: a higher
cost of equity capital for less diversiﬁed owners should lead to a more extensive use of bank
ﬁnancing.
These hypotheses are tested with data from a survey of private companies from the US.
As hypothesized, we ﬁnd that less diversiﬁed owners confronted with higher costs of equity
capital evince a higher demand for bank loans. The probability that a company made
an application for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey increases with lack of
diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, being less diversiﬁed has a positive and large eﬀect on leverage.
Owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk is therefore an important determinant of the capital
structure of private companies.How Does Owners’ Exposure to Idiosyncratic Risk
Inﬂuence the Capital Structure of Private Companies?
Elisabeth Mueller∗
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Abstract
This paper identiﬁes the entrepreneur’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk as an important
determinant of the demand for loans and the capital structure. The analysis is based
on a sample of small and medium-sized private companies from the United States.
The exposure to idiosyncratic risk is approximated by the share of personal net worth
invested in one company (SNWI). Exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of
equity capital, since higher equity returns are required as compensation. This therefore
makes bank ﬁnancing more attractive. We ﬁnd that SNWI increases both the demand
for new bank loans and leverage substantially.
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Private companies typically have only a limited number of owners, each with a large own-
ership share. This concentrated ownership helps to overcome control problems caused by
the opaqueness of business operations. However, it also exposes owners to idiosyncratic
risk, since they often invest a high share of their personal net worth in a single company
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)). Their personal portfolios are therefore not well
diversiﬁed. If owners require a compensation for their risk exposure, they have to demand
higher returns on their equity investment, which is equivalent to higher costs of equity capi-
tal. External ﬁnance from banks is therefore more attractive for owners with a concentrated
investment.
The main point of this paper is to investigate how owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic
risk inﬂuences demand for new bank loans and capital structure. Tests concerning capital
structure have so far neglected inﬂuences that stem from the speciﬁc ownership structure
of private companies. We test two hypotheses about the consequences of owners’ lack of
diversiﬁcation. First, since poor diversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital, we expect
a higher demand for bank ﬁnancing from owners who have invested a higher share of their
personal wealth in the company. This would be the consequence if owners tried to equalize
the marginal cost of equity and debt capital. Second, we hypothesize that a higher exposure
to idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage. This is the central point of interest of this paper:
a higher cost of equity capital for less diversiﬁed owners should lead to a more extensive use
of bank ﬁnancing.
The empirical analysis is based on the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) from
the year 1998. The survey is well suited for our analysis since it provides information on
1the ﬁnancial structure of private companies and the personal wealth of their owners. The
survey includes companies with up to 500 employees, i.e. companies for which concentrated
ownership is typical. The exposure to idiosyncratic risk can be empirically approximated by
the share of the owners’ net worth which is invested in one company. Since we are confronted
with reverse causality, we use an instrumental variables approach with age of the owner and
sex of the owner as instruments for the share of net worth invested.
Our hypotheses are conﬁrmed by the data. Less diversiﬁed owners confronted with higher
costs of equity capital evince a higher demand for bank loans. The probability that a
company made an application for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey increases
with lack of diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, being less diversiﬁed has a positive and large eﬀect
on leverage. A one standard deviation increase in the share of net worth invested leads,
ceteris paribus, to an increase in leverage of 16.2 percentage points. This is substantial,
especially when considering that average leverage in the sample is 33.3%. Owners’ exposure
to idiosyncratic risk is therefore an important determinant of the capital structure of private
companies.
The empirical results have important implications for our understanding of the ﬁnancing
of private companies. We ﬁnd that owners who are more exposed to the idiosyncratic risk
of their companies use bank ﬁnancing more extensively. It allows them to reduce their own
investment if they keep company size constant or, alternatively, to grow their companies
without increasing their risk exposure further. Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases
the cost of equity capital and accordingly the required returns of an investment project,
the availability of bank loans enables the proﬁtable realization of some investment projects
that would not have been realized otherwise. Bank ﬁnancing decreases the returns that are
2required for the realization of an investment project.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 discusses the related literature; Section 4
explains the data set and deﬁnes the variables; Section 5 shows the empirical results; and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
There are some marked diﬀerences between private and public companies. Whereas public
companies can have many owners, the ownership of private companies is typically concen-
trated among few owners with high ownership shares 1. There are no liquid markets for
the shares, because they cannot be traded on a stock exchange. This organizational form
is well adapted to the opaqueness and high costs of information acquisition typical of small
companies: it gives owner-managers a high incentive to exert eﬀort and non-managing own-
ers incentives to monitor the managers (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Grossman and Hart (1980)). Furthermore, with a high ownership share owners can signal
the quality of the company and reduce the cost of obtaining outside equity Leland and Pyle
(1977). However, this organizational form exposes the owners to the idiosyncratic risk of the
company, an exposure which is quite substantial. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)
document that, on average, owners of private companies have invested 41% of their net worth
in private equity, of which 82% is invested in just one actively managed company.
Interestingly, consequences of exposure to idiosyncratic risk have been primarily analyzed
1The private companies in the Survey of Small Business Finances 1998 have an average ownership share
of the largest owner of 79.6% and a median value of 100%.
3in the context of listed companies. Hired managers are exposed to idiosyncratic risk in
order to give them incentives to exert eﬀort. Risk-averse managers attach less value to
compensation contracts based on options or restricted stock, because such contracts expose
them to idiosyncratic risk (Lambert et al. (1991) and Kahl et al. (2003)). Exposure to
idiosyncratic risk has also an inﬂuence on the investment decisions of managers. Parrino et al.
(2005) show that despite potential wealth transfers from debtholders, managers compensated
with equity prefer safe projects to risky ones. Heaney and Holmen (2002) use data on the
exposure to idiosyncratic risk for Swedish shareholders of listed companies to approximate
the value they attach to control.
The main motivating paper for our hypotheses is the study by Kerins et al. (2004).
The authors ﬁnd that exposure to idiosyncratic risk has a large inﬂuence on the cost of
equity capital of private companies. The analysis is based on the capital asset pricing
model and uses data on newly public companies to simulate the cost of equity capital for
an entrepreneur who is able to invest in his or her own company and the stock market.
The relative weights of the investment in the company and the stock market determine the
total risk of the portfolio. The same total risk can be achieved by borrowing money and
investing it along with one’s own resources in the stock market. The expected return of this
comparison portfolio is the opportunity cost of equity capital for an entrepreneur, which is
calculated for diﬀerent assumed levels of investment in the private company. Underlying
the calculation is the presumption that rational owners will demand compensation for their
exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The model predicts an increase of 9.8 percentage points in the
opportunity cost of equity capital for a small company if the share of net worth invested in
the company changes from 15% to 25%. This is a substantial risk premium considering that
4annual returns on public equity, as calculated by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002),
were 11.0%, 14.6% and 24.7% for the periods 1990–92, 1993–95 and 1996–98 respectively.
The returns on public equity can be used as a benchmark for the cost of equity capital
if investors can diversify, since the returns do not include a compensation for exposure to
idiosyncratic risk.
The considerable inﬂuence of idiosyncratic risk on the cost of equity capital should lead
to large adjustments in the ﬁnancing of private companies, which is the topic of this paper.
A lack of diversiﬁcation makes bank loans more attractive. We derive the ﬁrst hypothesis
accordingly:
Hypothesis 1: Owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk have a higher demand
for new bank loans.
Owners who maximize company value will try to equalize the marginal cost of equity and
debt capital. From the increased cost of equity capital we would expect a sizable positive
eﬀect of lack of diversiﬁcation on leverage.
Hypothesis 2: Owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk choose higher leverage.
What remains to be discussed is the role of retained earnings in the ﬁnancing decision of an
owner of a private company. The cost of capital for retained earnings increases also in the
lack of diversiﬁcation, since retained earnings, as well as the original equity investment, are
part of the owner’s wealth that is invested in the company. Retained earnings of the past
years are included in the book value of equity and therefore captured in our analysis.
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984)) is complementary to our hypotheses.
5This theory predicts that companies prefer to ﬁnance with retained earnings, riskless debt
and new equity in decreasing order, because the costs of asymmetric information are smallest
for retained earnings and largest for new equity. Our hypotheses do not negate the role of
asymmetric information. They investigate the role of an additional component of the cost
of equity capital, namely the costs due to exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
3 Related Literature
The literature has come forward with several explanations for the capital structure of com-
panies. Most prominent are the trade-oﬀ theory and the pecking order theory, which have
been mainly tested for listed companies (see, for example, Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan
and Zingales (1995) and de Jong (2002)). There are also studies for private companies, but
inﬂuences from their concentrated ownership structure have so far not be taken into consid-
eration. Chittenden et al. (1996) investigate inﬂuences of company characteristics such as
size, age and the ability to provide company assets as collateral. Berger and Udell (1998)
study how the capital structure changes in the ﬁnancial growth cycle. Giannetti (2003)
focuses on diﬀerences among countries, aiming to identify the importance of legal rules and
ﬁnancial development.
Another strand of the literature studies aspects of owners’ ﬁnancial situation besides their
lack of diversiﬁcation. Cressy (1996) analyzes data on bank overdrafts of UK startup compa-
nies, focusing on loan conditions and company survival. He ﬁnds that banks agree to higher
overdraft limits if more collateral, measured as house equity, is available. Furthermore, sur-
vival probability increases if an entrepreneur used personal funds in starting up. Cavalluzzo
and Wolken (2005) test whether personal wealth aﬀects the availability of bank loans. The
6authors ﬁnd that greater private wealth increases the probability of loan approval, since
personal assets can be used as collateral for business loans. Avery et al. (1998) show that
personal commitments are important for ﬁrms seeking certain types of loans.
4 Data
4.1 Data Source
The Survey of Small Business Finances 1998 (SSBF), which is conducted by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, is used for the empirical analysis.
The survey provides information on private companies with up to 500 employees from non-
agricultural and non-ﬁnancial sectors in the United States. The survey was conducted in
1999 and targeted business that were in operation as of December, 1998. The reference
year for the information is generally year-end 1998. Companies were selected for the survey
by a two-stage stratiﬁed random sample design. The survey provides information on basic
ﬁrm and owner characteristics, sources of ﬁnancial services, experience with the most recent
loan application, information on the private wealth and credit history of the largest owner,
balance sheet information as well as income and expenses information.
This survey is well suited for our study because it provides information on the ﬁnancial
situation of private companies and on the personal wealth of their owners. The investigation
is restricted to the wave from 1998, since previous waves do not include information on
personal wealth.2
Only companies with positive equity values are included in the analysis, because it is
2Detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
7otherwise not possible to derive the share of the owners’ net worth that is invested.3 In
addition, companies are required to have positive assets and owners are required to have
positive private wealth. 2,617 companies are eventually included in the analysis.
4.2 Variables
The main concern of this paper is the inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation on the ﬁnancial
structure of private companies. We measure lack of diversiﬁcation as the ratio of the largest
owner’s equity investment to the net worth of the largest owner, i.e., as share of net worth
invested (SNWI). Net worth is deﬁned as the book value of the equity investment plus
the equity value of the primary residence plus the sum of all assets minus the sum of all
other liabilities. 90% of the companies in the SSBF are managed by an owner and not by a
hired employee. For the owner-managed companies it is likely that the largest owner takes
part in the management. The level of diversiﬁcation of the largest owner’s investments will
therefore be important for ﬁnancial decisions.
Two measures of diversiﬁcation are calculated. The ﬁrst measure, denoted by SNWI A,
considers only the value of the equity investment.
SNWI A =
(ownership share ∗ book value of equity)
net worth
The second measure, SNWI B, takes into account that the equity investment may not
be the only way in which the owners’ assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give
321% of the companies have negative or zero equity values. This is a common ﬁnding for small and
medium-sized enterprises. For example, KfW Research (2006) ﬁnds that almost 20% of German SMEs have
negative equity values.
8personal guarantees for company loans, use private assets as collateral and extend loans to
the company. The survey includes information on the extent of these activities for all of the
owners combined. This information is therefore multiplied by the ownership share of the
largest owner to produce an approximation of that owner’s personal involvement.
SNWI B =
ownership share ∗ (book value of equity + guarantees + collateral + loans)
net worth
Share of net worth invested is an approximation of the risk exposure of owners due to
their equity investment in a private company. Owners are exposed to several types of risk.
For example, there is a concentration of income from one source and the possibility that the
value of the ownership share could fall. These risks certainly increase with SNWI. However,
in order to completely describe the risk exposure of owners, it would be necessary to have
information on all of the assets in the owners’ portfolios and on the correlation structure of
their returns. For instance, if an owner has invested in the stock market and the returns on his
or her private company exhibit a negative correlation with the returns on the stock market,
his or her risk exposure is lower compared to a situation in which returns are positively
correlated. Since the survey has no information from which the correlation of returns could
be deduced, we must rely on size of equity investment relative to net worth as a proxy for
risk exposure. The credit rating is used as a control in the regressions to capture part of the
overall risk level of the company. In addition, we include industry dummies to control for
return characteristics of private equity that are identical within an industry.
It can be argued that SNWI underestimates the risk exposure of the owner. The measure
is based on the book value of equity, because the survey does not provide the market value.
9This reduces the variation in SNWI, since underestimation is more pronounced for successful
companies. However, there is still a large cross-sectional variation in SNWI. The book value
is also more similar to the original investment of the owner, which may be of relevance for
the owners’ perception of risk.
The data set under analysis also includes companies whose owners have unlimited liability,
i.e. they are liable for company obligations with all their private assets. The question arises
whether our measure of lack of diversiﬁcation is meaningful in this situation. The bankruptcy
law in the USA stipulates that private assets below exemption limits can be kept by owners
in a bankruptcy proceeding. In practise, owners often have no assets exceeding these limits
and therefore only lose their equity investment in a bankruptcy (Berkowitz and White (2004,
p. 71) and Fan and White (2003, p. 544)). It follows that SNWI is a valid proxy for risk
exposure for owners with unlimited liability as well.4
As a ﬁrst dependent variable we use the demand for new loans. The variable loan
application is equal to 1 if an application for a new loan was ﬁled in the three years
preceding the survey and 0 otherwise. Loan renewals are not counted. Most companies
applied for a loan at a commercial bank (71%). Finance companies were used by 11%,
4If a private company goes bankrupt in the USA with obligations still outstanding, an owner with un-
limited liability can declare personal bankruptcy in order to dispose of the company debt. It is possible to
give up all assets that are not exempt, but to keep future earnings (chapter 7) or to keep all assets and agree
to a repayment plan to repay part of the debts (chapter 13). The exemption rules diﬀer between states.
The median value for home equity is USD 15,000 and the median value for other personal assets is USD
7,000 (Berkowitz and White (2004)). If owners agree to keep up payments on loans that are secured on their
home or private car, they do not lose these assets. Furthermore, if the retirement savings are not excluded
from the bankruptcy proceeding in the ﬁrst place, they can be kept if the amount is reasonably necessary
to support oneself upon retirement (Jackson (2001)).
10savings banks and credit unions by 7%. 11% used other sources. Leverage is the second
dependent variable. It is deﬁned as the sum of a company’s total liabilities divided by
its total assets (sum of equity and liabilities). Total liabilities are the sum of long-term
liabilities, such as loans, mortgages, notes or bonds, and short-term liabilities due within
one year, such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, taxes payable, prepayments, deposits
and advances from customers. Leverage includes loans that are made by owners to their
companies and the outstanding amount on company credit cards. The use of personal credit
cards for company expenses is not included.5
The regressions include controls for many company and owner characteristics. We control
for company size, measured by number of employees, and company age, deﬁned as the
number of years since the company was founded or acquired. Ownership share is deﬁned
as the share of equity owned by the largest owner. Dummies for legal form diﬀerentiate
between sole proprietorships, partnerships, S- and C-corporations.6 All regressions include
industry dummies deﬁned at the two-digit SIC level. Regional dummies diﬀerentiate
between nine regions. A further dummy diﬀerentiates between urban and rural location.
The education level of the largest owner is captured by dummies for high school graduate
and college/postgraduate degree, with no high school degree being the base category. The
entrepreneurial work experience is measured as number of years owning or managing a
company. Dummies for the ethnicity of the owner cover Hispanic, Asian and African-
5Average leverage increases by 2 percentage points if personal credit cards are included in the deﬁnition.
We obtain identical regression results with this modiﬁcation.
6C- and S-corporations are both characterized by limited liability. C-corporations have to pay corporation
tax on proﬁts that are paid out to shareholders, whereas the proﬁts of S-corporations are only charged with
the personal income tax rate of their owners.
11American ownership with White as base category.
We also include control variables to capture the ﬁnancial standing of the company. First,
the credit rating by Dun and Bradstreet classiﬁes companies in ﬁve categories. The rating
reﬂects the likelihood of payment delinquency during the next 12 months. Second, we use
dummies for the credit history of the company and the owner. They cover whether
the ﬁrm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy within the past seven years, whether
the owner has been delinquent on personal obligations for 60 or more days within the past
three years, whether the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business obligations for 60 or more
days within the past three years, and whether any judgements have been rendered against
the principal owner within the past three years. The variable length gives the length of the
relationship with the company’s main ﬁnancial institution in months.7
4.3 Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables can be found in Table 1. The measures SNWI
A and SNWI B document a considerable lack of diversiﬁcation. SNWI A has an average
of 25.3%. By additionally considering guarantees, collateral and loans, the average value of
SNWI B increases by six percentage points.
The SSBF data cover small to medium-sized companies. The average number of employees
is 28.3 with a substantially lower median value of 5. 26% of the companies applied for a
loan in the three years preceding the survey. The average level of leverage stands at 33%.
As is typical for private companies, the ownership structure is concentrated with an average
71% of the highest values are replaced with the value of the 99th percentile (480 months) in order to
reduce the inﬂuence of extreme values.
12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company characteristics
Number of employees 28.3 5 58.1 1 482
Company age (in years) 15.3 12 12.4 1 104
Dummy loan application 0.263 0 0.440 0 1
Leverage (in %) 33.3 27.3 31.0 0 99.8
Length banking relationship (in months) 99.8 60 97.4 1 480
Owner characteristics
Net worth (in million US-$) 1.538 0.448 4.412 0.001 116
SNWI A (in %) 25.3 17.9 24.1 0.004 98.9
SNWI B (in %) 31.3 22.3 29.0 0.014 100
Ownership share largest owner (in %) 79.6 100 27.8 1 100
Owner age (in years) 51.2 51 11.3 21 95
Dummy female owner 0.206 0 0.404 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy.
ownership share of the largest owner of 79.6%. Even the median company has only one
owner. As Table 2 shows, the industry spectrum of the survey covers almost the whole US
economy.
The SSBF data has a complex sample design. The sample is stratiﬁed according to size,
region and urban versus rural area. In addition, companies with Hispanic, Asian and African-
American majority ownership and large companies are oversampled. We use unweighted
regressions with controls for the variables used for stratiﬁcation and oversampling. This
approach was also chosen by Bitler et al. (2005).
13Table 2: Industry Distribution
Industry No. of companies % of companies
SIC 1 – Mining, construction 262 10.0
SIC 2 – Manufacturing 125 4.8
SIC 3 – Manufacturing 177 6.8
SIC 4 – Transp., communication, utilities 97 3.7
SIC 5 – Retail trade 731 27.9
SIC 6 – Real estate 152 5.8
SIC 7 – Services 592 22.6
SIC 8 – Services 481 18.4
Total 2617 100
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy. Industry dummies at the
2-digit level are included in the regression analysis.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Endogeneity of Regressors
In the empirical analysis we need to be concerned with potential endogeneity of our main
variable of interest, share of net worth invested (SNWI). First of all, there is the problem of
reverse causality. If owners demand loans (and get the application granted), they have access
to ﬁnancial resources that allow them to limit their equity investment. Hence, demand for
loans may have a negative inﬂuence on SNWI. There is also a reverse causality problem with
respect to leverage. Reverse causality introduces a negative relationship between leverage and
SNWI, since the accumulated use of bank loans again allows a reduction in equity ﬁnance.
The negative inﬂuence of the reverse causality eﬀect on SNWI makes it more diﬃcult to
14ﬁnd evidence in favour of our hypotheses. The ownership share of a ﬁrm’s largest owner
can also be inﬂuenced by the demand for bank loans and by leverage. If bank ﬁnancing is
not available and a ﬁrm’s original owner has too few resources to meet the total investment
required, it may be necessary to take on an additional owner.
Second, we need to be wary of measurement error in company and owner related variables.
Most of the small companies included in the SSBF are not required by law to draw up a
balance sheet. Therefore, the measurement of the assets and liabilities of these companies
may be imprecise; there may be some error in the measurement of leverage. Information on
the net worth of the principal owner is provided in three categories: the value of the equity
investment, the value of home equity and the value of other nonﬁrm assets. There could also
be measurement error in the wealth information.8
Third, omitted variables may bias the coeﬃcient of SNWI. Controls for company risk are
important, since risk can inﬂuence both the owner’s invested share of personal wealth and
leverage. Bitler et al. (2005) ﬁnd a negative correlation between ﬁrm risk and ownership
share.9 Owners are only willing to take on a high ownership share if they consider the risk
to be manageable. In an extreme case, this could result in a negative correlation between
SNWI and exposure to risk. Risk is also an important factor for the bank’s decision whether
8Browning et al. (2003) consider problems that may arise when questions about aggregate values are asked
in surveys. They discuss the usefulness of total expenditure questions as opposed to asking for expenditure in
diﬀerent categories. First, rounding can happen, i.e. values may be noisy. However, even with rounding, the
total expenditure questions still contain valuable information. Second, it is possible that total expenditure
is underestimated, if only one question about the total is asked.
9Bitler et al. (2005) measure ﬁrm risk as the absolute value of the residual of a regression of the proﬁt-
to-equity ratio on ﬁrm characteristics.
15to extend a loan. Companies with higher risk will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain loans, i.e.
they will have lower leverage. The inﬂuence of risk could then lead to a spurious positive
correlation between leverage and SNWI. We control for risk with the credit rating of the
company and with the credit history of both company and owner. Other company charac-
teristics included, such as size, age and industry, also help to control for risk. Nevertheless,
the controls may not capture company risk perfectly.
To deal with the above-mentioned problems of endogeneity we use speciﬁc owner charac-
teristics as instruments of SNWI. The ﬁrst instrument is age of the largest owner measured
in years. Heaton and Lucas (2000) show that investment in private equity changes with
age; this instrument should thus be related to SNWI. For age to be a valid instrument, it
is important that we control for other variables in the second stage regression. First, we
control for the education level and the experience of the owner, since they are related to age
and it is to be expected that better educated and more experienced owners will ﬁnd it easier
to obtain bank loans. By using education and experience as explicit controls, we use only
the part of SNWI that can be explained by age, net of experience and education. Second,
we control for company age. Within 10 years, 80% of companies exit the market (Dunn
et al. (1988)). It is therefore likely that older owners run more successful companies. Own-
ers of successful companies may have more outside wealth and therefore lower SNWI. Also,
according to the pecking order theory, it can be expected that successful companies ﬁnance
more with retained earnings. Survivorship bias may therefore lead to a positive spurious
relationship between SNWI and demand for bank ﬁnancing through the instrument owner
age, if we do not control for the age of the company.
A further instrument is the sex of the owner. The dummy ‘female owner’ takes the value 1
16for female owners and the value 0 for male owners. It has to be acknowledged that there may
be diﬀerences in demand for bank loans or capital structure in a univariate analysis of male
and female owned companies resulting from company characteristics that diﬀer between male
and female owners. For example, the SSBF data show that the companies of male owners are
on average larger than the companies of female owners. However, there is no reason to expect
that male and female owners diﬀer in their ﬁnancing strategies after detailed company and
owner characteristics are controlled for. In the second stage regression we therefore control
for, among other things, company size and industry as well as education, experience and
credit history of the owner.
Table 3 shows the ﬁrst-stage regression results. From columns (1) and (2) it can be seen
Table 3: First-Stage Regression Results
Dep. variable: SNWI A SNWI B
(1) (2)
Owner age -0.341*** -0.406***
(0.055) (0.064)
Dummy female owner -3.679*** -4.238***
(1.174) (1.352)
Number of observations 2617 2617
Joint signiﬁcance of
excluded instruments, F(2, 2545) 24.40*** 25.18***
Shea’s partial R squared 0.019 0.020
R squared 0.179 0.228
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions also include controls for company size and age, dummies
for industry at the 2-digit level, dummies for legal form, region, urban/rural area and credit history. Controls
for the credit rating of the company, experience, education and ethnicity of the owner are also included.
17that owner age has a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on SNWI. Older owners have had more
time to build up wealth outside the company by saving their income. This income can be
either from owning a company or wage income from employment. The dummy for female
owners shows that women invest a smaller share of their personal wealth in one company.
A possible explanation for the higher investment shares among men would be if owning or
managing a company has a higher importance for them, for example, if they are under more
pressure to earn a living.10
5.2 Demand for Bank Loans
Lack of diversiﬁcation sharply increases the cost of equity capital because it exposes owners
to idiosyncratic risk for which they may require compensation. Less diversiﬁed owners can
therefore be expected to express a higher demand for bank loans as an alternative source of
ﬁnancing. This is the content of Hypothesis 1, which we test in this subsection. Bank loans
allow owners to reduce their ﬁnancial exposure to the company or to grow the company
without increasing their exposure.
The information for our dependent variable, the incidence of loan applications, spans
the time period of the three years preceding the survey, i.e. of 1996–1998, whereas lack of
diversiﬁcation and the other regressors are measured at the end of ﬁscal year 1998. There is a
potential endogeneity problem in that the left hand side variable is measured before the right
hand side variables.11 However, there is not much time-variation but a lot of cross-sectional
10Bitler et al. (2005) use similar instruments for ownership for data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
namely age, age squared and dummies for type of company acquisition.
11Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) face the same situation in their analysis of loan turndowns and discrimi-
nation also conducted with the SSBF data.
18variation in the right hand side variables. Our key variable SNWI covers investment in the
company in relation to the overall wealth, which is likely to be quite time-invariant, since
overall wealth does not ﬂuctuate much from one year to the next. Furthermore, ownership
shares typically change little over time. To deal with this endogeneity problem, we use the
time-invariant instruments sex of the owner and type of company acquisition. Owner age
is measured at the time of the survey, but here the variation due to the timing of the loan
application is negligible compared to the overall variance of this variable.
Table 4 presents probit regressions on demand for bank loans. The OLS speciﬁcation in
column (1) shows a higher demand for bank loans for owners with higher values of SNWI,
but the result is aﬀected by reverse causality. If owners decide, for whatever reason, not
to use bank loans as a means of ﬁnancing their company, they must rely more heavily on
their own resources; this increases SNWI. The results also show that larger and younger
companies exhibit a higher demand for new loans.
In the regressions in columns (2) to (6) we use instruments to control for reverse causality.
The basic speciﬁcation in column (2) supports Hypothesis 1; SNWI increases the probability
of loan applications. Owners who are less diversiﬁed approach banks more often in order to
obtain additional funds. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase in SNWI A leads,
ceteris paribus, to an increase of 30.2 percentage points in the probability of making a loan
application. The inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation is therefore quite substantial, especially
considering that the probability of applying for a new loan is only 26.3%. The IV estimate is
substantially larger than the OLS estimate, although an upward bias from reverse causality
is expected for OLS. We therefore conclude that the OLS estimate was aﬀected by a bias



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20instruments are not related to the error.
The remaining speciﬁcations are intended as a robustness check. In column (3) we addi-
tionally control for the ownership share of the largest owner. The coeﬃcient of this variable
is positive at the 10% signiﬁcance level. Owners who choose a high ownership share to have
control over their companies may need more bank ﬁnancing for their investment opportuni-
ties.12 In column (4) we employ our second measure of diversiﬁcation, SNWI B. Here the
results suggest as well that lack of diversiﬁcation increases demand for bank loans.
Next, we investigate whether results change, if only companies with limited liability (S-
and C-corporations) are included in the regressions. As already mentioned, owners are, in
practice, unlikely to lose more money than they have invested, even with unlimited liability.
However, it is still of interest to report results for companies with limited liability separately,
since there may be diﬀerences in the way owners perceive risk. When we restrict our analysis
to companies with limited liability, we still ﬁnd that lack of diversiﬁcation increases loan
demand.
In companies with more than one owner, the exposure to idiosyncratic risk and therefore
the cost of equity to the owner can diﬀer between owners. In order to remove the inﬂuence
of other owners, we investigate our hypotheses separately for companies with just one owner.
However, we think that the focus on the largest owner makes sense in most cases, since the
largest owner will be less diversiﬁed than other owners, if their external wealth is the same.
It is therefore likely that we captured the owner with the highest exposure to idiosyncratic
12For the speciﬁcations with ownership share in Table 4 and Table 5 we additionally use dummies for the
type of the company acquisition - the basis category is founded with dummies for purchased and inherited
respectively - as instruments, since the informational content of our two standard instruments is not suﬃcient
here.
21risk in the previous regressions. The results for companies with just one owner are shown in
column (6). As before, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of lack of diversiﬁcation on the demand
for loans.
Overall, we ﬁnd robust evidence for the hypothesis that a higher exposure to idiosyncratic
risk leads to a higher demand for bank ﬁnancing.
5.3 Inﬂuence on Leverage
Table 5 displays the eﬀect of poor diversiﬁcation on leverage. In column (1) we present
the results of the OLS speciﬁcation. The negative sign of SNWI is due to non-standard
measurement error. Liabilities are directly or indirectly included in the dependent variable
and in SNWI. Liabilities constitute the numerator of the dependent variable. SNWI has eq-
uity times ownership share in its numerator with equity calculated as the diﬀerence between
total assets and liabilities. If there is measurement error in liabilities, this will introduce a
negative relationship between leverage and SNWI. In order to control both for measurement
error and for reverse causality, we use an instrumental variables approach in the remaining
speciﬁcations.
In column (2) we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of SNWI. A more severe lack
of diversiﬁcation therefore leads to higher leverage, after controlling for endogeneity. The
inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation on the equilibrium value of leverage is quite large. A one
standard deviation increase in SNWI A leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in leverage of 18.0
percentage points. This is indeed substantial, especially when considering that the average
value of leverage in the sample is 33.3%. The empirical evidence clearly conﬁrms Hypothesis






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23show an insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of size on leverage and a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence of
age. As companies grow older they often use accumulated proﬁts to pay down debt and to
increase their equity base.
In addition to the regressors already employed in the demand equation, we control for the
length of the relationship with the company’s main ﬁnancial institution, since it was shown
that an established banking relationship can help with the quantity of available credit (see,
for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994)).13 Without a relationship control, the instrument
owner age may be directly related to leverage, since this instrument can be correlated with
the length of the banking relationship. The length of the relationship with the main ﬁnancial
institution has a quadratic inﬂuence on leverage with a maximum at about 11 years. Since
we have more instruments than endogenous variables, we can test the statistical validity of
the instruments with overidentifying restrictions. As reported in the table, the instruments
pass this test for all speciﬁcations.
In the next two columns we show robustness checks with all observations. In column (3)
we additionally control for the ownership share of the largest owner. Ownership share has
a positive but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence on leverage. The insigniﬁcance of the coeﬃcient may
be due to the relative weakness of the instruments. In column (4) we use SNWI B as an
alternative measure for the level of diversiﬁcation. The regressions conﬁrm the result of our
base speciﬁcation.
As in the previous subsection, we also investigate the robustness of the results with
subsamples of companies with limited liability and of companies with only one owner. The
13We do not use this regressor in the demand equation. For companies who applied for a loan we could
use the length of the relationship with the institution where they applied; for companies who did not apply
for a loan, however, there is no meaningful equivalent.
24regressions in columns (5) and (6) show that the results remain unchanged by the restrictions
on the included companies.
Strebulaev (2004) cautions that in the presence of adjustment costs, cross-sectional rela-
tionships between leverage and other variables determined by empirical analysis may diﬀer
from the relationships expected if variables are at their target level. The argument is illus-
trated with the help of the trade-oﬀ theory, which postulates a positive relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability since interest paid can be deducted from proﬁts when it comes to
the calculation of taxes. Even if the trade-oﬀ theory is valid, we may still observe a negative
relationship between leverage and proﬁtability if proﬁts are used to pay down loans and
leverage is adjusted infrequently. In our case, both leverage and SNWI are likely aﬀected by
adjustment costs. Higher proﬁts will lead to lower leverage and, to a small degree, to lower
values of SNWI, if proﬁts are partially used to reduce debts and partially paid out to the
owners. This could introduce a positive relationship between the variables. However, this
inﬂuence of proﬁtability is removed from our analysis through the use of instruments which
are unrelated to proﬁtability.
Overall, our empirical analysis ﬁnds that lack of diversiﬁcation leads to higher lever-
age. The empirical results have important implications for our understanding of the capital
structure of private companies. We ﬁnd that entrepreneurs who are more exposed to the
idiosyncratic risk of their companies use bank ﬁnancing more extensively. Bank ﬁnancing
allows them to grow their companies without increasing their risk exposure further through
additional equity investment. Alternatively, entrepreneurs can use bank ﬁnancing to reduce
their own investment. Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capi-
tal and, accordingly, the required returns of an investment project, this also means that the
25availability of bank loans makes the realization of some investment projects proﬁtable that
would not have been carried out if no such loans were available.
6 Conclusion
The ﬁnancing of private companies relies to a large extent on the personal resources of their
owners. Equity investments often amount to a substantial share of owners’ total net worth,
which exposes them to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies. Since this risk exposure
increases the cost of equity capital substantially, it should have an important inﬂuence on
the capital structure of private companies. If owners try to equalize the marginal costs of
equity and debt ﬁnancing, companies led by owners who have a higher share of net worth
invested should have a higher demand for bank loans and should display higher values for
leverage. These are the core hypotheses tested in this paper.
Using survey data of private companies in the US, we ﬁnd that lack of diversiﬁcation
increases demand for loans, measured as the probability of making a loan application, as well
as leverage. This paper identiﬁes owners’ risk exposure as a statistically and economically
important inﬂuence on the capital structure of private companies.
In future research it would be of interest to test whether the eﬀect of exposure to id-
iosyncratic risk on leverage found for private companies also exists for public companies.
On theoretical grounds, we would also expect an eﬀect for public companies with a concen-
trated ownership structure. It may be possible to use public companies in which families or
founders hold high ownership shares for a corresponding test.
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